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Public opposition to efficiency-enhancing policies is a significant barrier to addressing 
many environmental challenges. We use a market experiment to explore the 
acceptability of three types of instruments: Pigouvian taxes and subsidies, and quantity 
regulation. We find that overall more than half of voters oppose efficiency-enhancing 
policies. The results replicate previous findings of tax aversion, and, by providing 
evidence of subsidy and regulation aversion, the estimates also suggest the existence 
of a broader aversion to market intervention. Voters supported subsidies significantly 
more than taxes while supporting quantity regulation significantly less than taxes. This is 
consistent with norms against coercive policy instruments. Concerning a possible trade-
off between acceptability and efficiency, estimates indicate differences across 
instruments. Support for regulation relative to not having any policy in place increases 
considerably if inefficient half measures are proposed instead of efficient full measures. 
This is less true for taxes and subsidies. The language used to describe the policy also 

















Public opposition to efficiency-enhancing policies is a significant barrier to addressing 
many environmental challenges. Indeed, identifying policies that mitigate or solve 
problems often is not the challenge; rather, it is the political difficulty of implementing the 
policies. This sort of opposition can arise from a lack of trust or understanding about 
policy instruments, but evidence has begun to show that it can also arise from 
behavioral considerations beyond the calculus of neoclassical economics. People often 
oppose Pigouvian taxes, even when the instrument improves material well-being 
(Cherry et al., 2011, Kallbekken et al., 2010 and Kallbekken et al., 2011), and 
perceptions of unfairness and coerciveness can create resistance to efficiency-
enhancing taxes and regulations (Baron and Jurney, 1993, Dresner et al., 2006, 
Eriksson et al., 2006, Fujii et al., 2004 and Kallbekken and Sælen, 2011). Therefore, to 
improve the feasibility of efficient solutions, it is important to consider and understand 
not only the material effects of policy, but also the behavioral elements that provoke 
opposition. This is illustrated by recent studies that show policies can incorporate 
certain elements to improve the acceptability of a given policy instrument, such as 
earmarking revenues to increase support for taxation (Harrington et al., 2001, Hsu et al., 
2008, Schade and Schlag, 2003, Schuitema and Steg, 2008 and Sælen and 
Kallbekken, 2011). 
 
The existing literature, however, focuses largely on tax instruments, with only a few 
studies considering other context-specific policy instruments in addition to taxes.1 In 
addition, most studies in this area rely on survey methods that might not effectively 
disentangle material interests from possible behavioral influences. Herein we extend the 
literature by providing a systematic investigation of behavioral elements that affect the 
acceptability for a spectrum of policy instruments. We investigate the acceptability of 
taxes, subsidies and direct regulation, at efficient and inefficient levels, and we use 
experimental methods to control for material interests and ensure equivalency across 
policy instruments. From this framework, we investigate four issues. First, studies have 
documented the existence of tax aversion—the opposition to a tax that is materially 
beneficial (Kallbekken et al., 2010 and Kallbekken et al., 2011)—but the literature is 
silent on whether such aversion exists with other instruments as well. We replicate a 
test of tax aversion, but also examine whether this type of aversion is actually a broader 
behavioral phenomenon observed also with subsidies and regulation. Second, we take 
advantage of the controlled laboratory setting to investigate the relative support for 
equivalent tax, subsidy and regulation instruments. Previous work suggests that 
opposition is heightened when the instrument is viewed as coercive (Attari et al., 2009, 
Baron and Jurney, 1993, Jakobsson et al., 2000 and Steg et al., 2006). By controlling 
for material interests, we are able to more precisely isolate such behavioral influences 
on relative acceptability. Third, we examine differences in the acceptability of efficient 
and inefficient measures for all three instruments—tax, subsidy and regulation—which 
might reveal a trade-off between efficiency and acceptability. Of particular interest are 
the behavioral implications if this trade-off varies across instruments. Fourth, we explore 
how language can influence the level of acceptability by varying the description of each 
instrument. While previous studies report that language matters in the case of taxes 
(e.g., Kallbekken et al., 2011 and Hardisty et al., 2010), we consider all three 
instruments. 
 
2. Experimental design and hypotheses 
Falk and Heckmann (2009) point out that experimental methods are well-suited for 
inquiries of individual decision-making because the lab offers control over key elements 
that are often fixed or unobservable in the field. In our case, the lab allows us to control 
the effectiveness of the alternative instruments, and the individual payoffs they produce; 
thereby isolating behavioral influences beyond material self-interest.2 By allowing for 
such control in a general setting, a lab experiment complements earlier survey based 
studies that  
 
 
Fig. 1. Supply, demand and efficiency gains. 
 
focus on more context-specific policy proposals. One important concern of lab 
experiments is that the results might not generalize to the “real world” (the issue of 
external validity). This is a valid point, but there are also many results suggesting that 
some of the objections are overstated. It has for instance been shown that students, 
which are often used as participants, do not differ significantly from other groups in 
important settings, although in some settings they are not representative of the general 
population (Falk and Heckmann, 2009). Also, behavior in lab experiments has been 
shown to be similar to behavior in field (“real world”) experiments (Güth et al., 2007). 
Bardsley (2010) argues, however, that “the relational nature of social psychological 
phenomena is systematically overlooked”. The fact that our results fit well with results 
obtained using other methods, such as surveys, gives us some additional confidence in 
their external validity. In the remainder of this section, we explain the basic market 
setting, details of the alternative policy instruments, experimental framework, 
procedures, and specific research hypotheses. 
 
2.1. Experimental market 
We construct an experimental market with externalities, in which the externality can be 
internalized with an efficient Pigouvian tax/subsidy or reduced with a quantity regulation. 
The market consists of five buyers who make a choice on how many units (between 0 
and 8) of a fictitious good to buy at a pre-set price from an automated seller. All trading 
occurs in tokens, with 100 tokens equal to US$1. The buyers impose external costs on 
each other through their purchases. They are informed about their resale values (which 
are 85, 70, 60, 55, 45, 40, 30, and 15 tokens for the eight units, respectively), and also 
that the market price is 38 tokens, which stays constant throughout the experiment. 
 
Whenever a buyer purchases a unit of the good, it imposes external costs of 3 tokens 
on each of the four other buyers in their group. The marginal damage from each unit 
purchased is therefore 12 tokens. The market equilibrium, without any policy, has all 
buyers purchasing six units at a price of 38. In 
 
Table 1. Experimental setting. 
 
 
this equilibrium, each buyer gains a payoff of 55 tokens (consumer surplus of 127 
tokens minus external costs of 72 tokens) from the purchases of others). The socially 
optimal outcome is for each buyer to purchase four units, which results in an aggregate 
improvement of 75 (15 tokens per buyer) over the market equilibrium. This translates to 
a 27% efficiency gain.3 The shaded area in Fig. 1 represents the efficiency improvement 
of the social optimum over the market equilibrium. 
 
2.2. Policies 
The experiment considers six policy schemes—three instruments, each at two efficiency 
levels. For an (efficient) full tax/subsidy, the rate is equal to the marginal external cost of 
12, and for an (inefficient) half tax/subsidy, the rate is equal to half the marginal external 
cost, i.e., 6. In the case of a full-quantity regulation and half-quantity regulation subjects 
cannot buy more than four and five units, respectively. 
 
With a tax scheme in place, participants pay for each unit they buy, and the tax 
revenues are then returned in lump-sum fashion to the entire group at the end of the 
period; with a subsidy scheme, the participants receive a subsidy for each of the eight 
units they do not buy (including the ones they would not buy anyway since their values 
are below the price), and the subsidy cost is then paid lump-sum by the entire group at 
the end of the period. Note that fundamentally there is no difference between a tax and 
a subsidy with the same rate: given a certain amount of purchases, participants realize 
the same payoffs independent of whether there is a tax or an equivalent subsidy.4 
Full tax, full subsidy and full quantity-regulation schemes are efficient in equilibrium 
because the former two make the participants internalize the external costs their 
purchases cause, while the latter does not allow buying any units that cost the group on 
aggregate more than they benefit it. With all three schemes, the new equilibrium 
quantity declines on the aggregate from 30 to 20 units, with individual buyers reducing 
the number of units purchased from 6 to 4 units. In each case, the market equilibrium is 
shifted to equal the socially optimal outcome. 
 
Half tax, half subsidy and half quantity-regulation schemes are, while efficiency-
improving compared to the baseline without policies, not efficient. In the new 
equilibrium, buyers reduce their purchases by only one unit each, for a total reduction 
from 30 to 25. With a full tax/subsidy/quantity regulation, individual equilibrium payoffs 
increase to 70 (from 55 without any policy); with a half tax/subsidy/quantity regulation, 
they increase only to 65. 
 
2.3. Experimental design 
Table 1 summarizes the experimental design.5 Sessions consisted of four stages. The 
first stage consisted of five market periods without any policy instrument, which served 
to familiarize subjects with the market environment. In the three subsequent stages, 
subjects voted in nine referenda—three in each stage—that determined which policy 
instrument, if any, would be implemented in the subsequent three market periods. The 
experiment has three treatment variables that alter the characteristics of the referenda: 
instrument (tax, subsidy and regulation), efficiency (full measure, half measure and no 
policy), and language (label and generic, see below). Treatments were applied within 
and between sessions in the following manner. The instrument presented in the 
referenda varied across stages and sessions. In tax and subsidy sessions, stages one 
and three present tax or subsidy referenda, respectively. Stage two presents regulation 
referenda in both the tax and subsidy sessions. The efficiency of an instrument varies 
within each stage, with the three referenda of each stage presenting the following 
choices: full measure vs. no policy, half measure vs. no policy, and full measure vs. half 
measure. 
 
The language used to describe the instruments varies across tax and subsidy sessions. 
In the label-language treatment, the market instruments are described using the terms 
“tax” or “subsidy,” while the generic language uses “payments” instead. In a tax session, 
subjects either “pay a tax” or make an “additional payment” for each unit they  
 
Table 2. Market efficiency and individual payoffs by policy instrument and language. 
 
purchase, and in a subsidy session, they either “receive a subsidy” or “receive an 
additional payment” for each unit they do not purchase. The differences in language for 
the regulation schemes are more subtle: in the label-language treatments the 
instructions either say “the policy allows buyers to purchase up to […] units in each 
market session” (in sessions with a subsidy) or “the policy restricts buyers from 
purchasing more than […] units in each market session” (tax). In the treatments with 
generic language, we say in both cases “the policy sets a purchasing limit of […] units in 
each market session.” 
 
2.4. Procedures 
We conducted the experiment in the spring of 2011 at Colorado State University. A total 
of 95 subjects participated in five sessions, each consisting of nine referenda; therefore, 
we observe 855 voting decisions. To facilitate subject understanding of the experimental 
setting, we began each session by administering a quiz and reviewing the answers. 
Each session lasted about 90 min, and participants earned an average of about US$20. 




From the experimental design, we examine four sets of hypotheses that inform the 
research questions presented in Section 1. To replicate previous reports of tax aversion 
and investigate whether the behavioral phenomenon extends to other instruments, we 
test if subjects oppose tax, subsidy and regulatory instruments that improve material 
welfare. To investigate whether any aversion varies across instruments, we test if 
subjects indicate equal support for tax, subsidy and regulatory instruments. To 
investigate the possible tradeoff between efficiency and acceptability, we test if subjects 
express equal support for an efficient and inefficient instrument and whether any 
differences exist across instruments. And to explore the influence of language on 




To confirm that a vote for a policy would indeed be an efficiency-enhancing vote, we 
first review how the actual policy instruments affected market outcomes. Table 2 
reports, for each policy scheme realized through a vote, market efficiency, as measured 
by the percent of earnings generated relative to the optimal outcome, and the 
underlying mean payoffs earned by individual buyers. The numbers confirm that market 
efficiency is lowest in cases of no policy (82.6%), higher with half measures (90.5–
93.4%) and highest with full measures (94.2–98.6%). These numbers correspond well 
to the predicted levels of 78.6, 92.9 and 100.0%. Comparing across instruments, taxes 
and subsides appear to generate similar levels of market efficiency, with regulation 
leading to levels that exceed both taxes and subsidies. The strong performance of 
regulation is expected considering the instrument restricts the decision space, which 
prevents subjects from erring on one side by buying too many units, and it does not 
involve any enforcement or compliance complications. 
 
We now turn to the issue of acceptability by examining voting behavior. Table 3 
provides the descriptive statistics for the level of support, as measured by the 
percentage of yes votes, across referenda type, policy instruments and language. The 
aggregate numbers reveal four findings. First, we observe substantial tax aversion: the 
opposition to taxes that improve material well-being. Overall, about half of voters did not 
support Pigouvian tax instruments. The observed tax aversion corresponds to levels 
previously reported in the literature (Cherry et al., 2011, Kallbekken et al., 
2010 and Kallbekken et al., 2011). Second, in an extension of the literature, we find that 
the ‘tax aversion’ phenomenon is not limited to taxes. Though the level of aversion 
varies, we find significant opposition to efficiency-enhancing market intervention, 
whether it is taxes, subsidies or quantity regulation. Tax aversion therefore appears to 
be a more general aversion to intervention in the market. Third, the numbers show a 
trade-off between acceptability and efficiency and that this trade-off varies across 
instruments. Specifically, support for full market mechanisms (tax and subsidy) was 
greater when the alternative was a half measure,  
 
Table 3. Acceptability of intervention by policy instrument and referendum type. 
 
 
Table 4. Panel estimates of voting models. 
 
 
as compared to the case of the alternative being no policy. This is not the case with 
regulation—support for full regulation was similar whether the alternative was a half 
measure or no policy. However, support for half regulation is much stronger (by 22 
percentage points) than support for full regulation when the alternative is no policy. 
There is no such effect for subsidies, and a weaker effect (10 percentage points) for 
taxes. This might suggest the motivation underlying the aversion to market mechanisms 
(taxes and subsidies) might differ from the aversion to regulation. Fourth, the language 
used to describe the policy influences acceptability. This is particularly apparent in the 
case of the tax instrument. The influence of language follows a considerable line of 
research documenting the impact of labeling and framing (Bütler and Maréchal, 2007, 
McCaffery and Baron, 2003, Ross and Ward, 1996 and Tversky and Kahneman, 1981). 
 
We follow the aggregate numbers with a conditional analysis by estimating the 





where Yit is a binary variable that indicates whether the ith subject voted in favour of the 
proposed instrument in referendum t (=1 if yes; =0 otherwise); Instrumentit is a vector of 
indicator variables that signifies the policy instrument proposed to subject i in 
referendum t (subsidy, regulation; tax omitted); Efficiencyit is a vector of two indicator 
variables that signify the efficiency options presented to subject i in referenda t (half vs. 
no, full vs. half; full vs. no omitted); Languagei is a binary variable that indicates one of 
two descriptions of the policy instruments (=1 if labels; =0 if generic); ϕt is a set of T − 1 
(T = 9) dummy variables that capture potential referenda timing effects; α is the 
estimated intercept, ui are random effects that control for unobservable individual 
characteristics (e.g., risk aversion), and ɛit is the well-behaved error term. 6 Four models 
are estimated, a pooled model that examines voting behavior across all policy 
instruments and three instrument models that examine voting behavior specific to each 
policy instrument. 
 
Estimates of the voting models, presented in Table 4, sharpen the observations from 
the aggregated data. Overall, estimated parameters reveal significant opposition to all 
three policy instruments, despite being more efficient than no policy. Thus, results 
replicate previous findings of tax aversion but, by providing evidence of subsidy and 
regulation aversion, the estimates also suggest the existence of a broader aversion to 
market intervention. However, despite the instruments yielding equal payoffs in 
equilibrium, opposition does vary across policy instruments. From the pooled model, 
voters supported subsidies significantly more than taxes while supporting regulation 
significantly less than taxes. The conditional estimates indicate that support was 13.3 
percentage points higher for subsidies and 21.4 percentage points less for regulation, 
both in comparison with taxes. 
 
Concerning a possible trade-off between acceptability and efficiency, estimates indicate 
differences across instruments. Support for regulation relative to no policy increases 
considerably if inefficient half measures are proposed instead of efficient full measures 
(p < 0.001, pooled model). This is less true for taxes and subsidies. But for the two 
market mechanisms, support increases for an efficient full measure if the alternative is 
an inefficient half measure instead of no policy (p = 0.007 and <0.001). This is not the 
case for regulation. 
 
The divergent result between the market mechanisms and regulation suggests a 
difference in underlying motives. In particular, the results are consistent with previous 
results that perceptions of coercion can negatively affect the acceptability of policies 
(Baron and Jurney, 1993), as the most coercive instrument (regulation) receives the 
least support, and the instrument usually perceived as least coercive (subsidies) 
receives the most support. 
 
Estimates provide mixed results for the impact of language. Across the pooled and 
policy models, estimates reveal that the description of the policies (language) influenced 
support for taxes (p = 0.026), but not subsidies or regulation (p = 0.802 and 0.361). The 
positive effect of the tax label differs from some previous findings that show a negative 
effect, which might be due to differences in the use of the tax label and the alternative 
choice to the tax instrument. Further, the imprecise nature of language impedes clean 
comparisons across studies. 
 
4. Conclusions 
Public opposition is a primary barrier to implementing policies that can mitigate or solve 
many of the world's environmental problems. Research shows the underlying elements 
of the opposition goes beyond standard self-interest. Therefore, improving the 
prospects of efficiency-enhancing policies requires a better understanding of 
acceptability. In this study, we complement previous work by using a controlled market 
setting to investigate the behavioral influences behind the acceptance of alternative 
policies. We replicate previous reports of tax aversion, but also find this type of aversion 
exists with subsidies and quantity regulation. Thus, so-called tax aversion might be a 
broader type of policy or intervention aversion. This has implications for the efforts to 
understand and overcome such aversion, and suggests the challenge of implementing 
effective solutions is more daunting than previously thought. It also raises the issue of 
whether previous findings that suggest ways to overcome tax aversion, e.g. using trial 
runs (Cherry et al., 2011), can be effective with alternative policy instruments. 
 
We also find the extent of policy aversion differs across the three instruments, with the 
numbers indicating that subjects prefer taxes over regulation and subsidies over taxes. 
Further, the numbers reveal a trade-off between acceptability and efficiency, but it also 
varies across the instruments. Differences in aversion and preferences are consistent 
with previous reports that perceptions of coercion negatively affect a policy's 
acceptability. This suggests that perceived infringement on personal freedom might be a 
major reason for the opposition to efficiency-enhancing policies, and that providing 
alternatives (e.g., improving public transit at the same time as increasing fuel taxation) 
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